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Note
Preferential Treatment or Discriminatory Standards:
Do Employer-provided Insurance Plans Violate Title
VII When They Exclude Treatment for Breast Cancer?
Laurie Dechery*
On the eve of the deadline for her entry into HCT/ABMT
treatment, a high dosage chemotherapy treatment program for her
breast cancer,1 Karen E. Henderson sought a preliminary in-
junction2 against her health plan provider for refusing to pay for
the treatment.' Henderson claimed that the provider, by denying
coverage, discriminated against her in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)4 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.' The federal district court, finding that Henderson failed
to provide sufficient evidence that she was likely to prevail on the
merits of her claim, denied the injunction.6
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; A.M. 1983,
Harvard University; B.A. 1981, State University of New York at Buffalo. I
would like to thank Professor Stephen Beffort of the University of Minnesota
Law School for his help and support.
1. Appellants' Appendix at 19, Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70
F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (No. 95-2469) [hereinafter Appellants'
Appendix] (Ratkin Aft. para. 7) ("Mrs. Henderson must follow a treatment
program rigid as to time sequence. That sequence has already been started....
Administration of chemotherapy on this program should start by June 16,
1995."). For a description of HCT/ABMT, high dosage chemotherapy with
autologous bone marrow transplantation, see infra Part I.A.
2. Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., No. 4:95-CV-1051-CAS, 1995 WL
449086, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 15, 1995).
3. See Appellants' Appendix, supra note 1, at 44 (Ratkin Aff. Ex. 2)
(providing a model consent form explaining the procedure); infra Part I.A.
(describing HCT/ABMT for breast cancer).
4. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
V 1993).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6. Henderson, 1995 WL 449086, at *1-3. Other grounds for denial
included Henderson's failure to demonstrate irreparable harm, request of the
wrong relief in terms of monetary damages, and failure "to exhaust the
contractual duties under the ERISA approved group health plan ... [which]
requires claimants to wait a minimum of sixty days before filing any civil
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On expedited appeal,7 the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court, remanding the case for a preliminary injunction and trial on
the merits.' In its reported opinion, the Eighth Circuit held that
if a plaintiff can demonstrate that a given treatment is
nonexperimental and that the exclusionary insurance plan
provides the same treatment for other comparable conditions, the
denial of treatment arguably violates the ADA.9 The court
expressed no opinion regarding the Title VII discrimination
charge. 1
0
Vague terms in health insurance contracts have led to a
growing wave of litigation among plaintiffs caught between their
physicians' medical recommendations and their insurers' business
judgment." By focusing exclusively on legal questions of contract
interpretation, courts historically have avoided ethical issues and
provided what they considered just results. 2 Evolution in
contract drafting toward more explicit exclusionary terms makes
it necessary to confront those ethical issues. In the context of a
worsening health care crisis, defining what constitutes discrimi-
litigation." Id. at *3. The district court found it dispositive of a discrimination
charge that the list of exceptions to a blanket exclusion of HCT/ABMT failed to
include breast cancer. Id. Furthermore, because the plan on its face made no
distinctions based on sex, the court found the Title VII claim also lacked any
support. Id.
7. See Appellants' Appendix, supra note 1, at 18-23 (Ratkin Aff. paras. 3-
13) (explaining the deadline facing Henderson).
8. Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., No. 95-2469EMSL, 1995 WL
394046, at *1 (8th Cir. June 16, 1995). On the dissent of Judge Hansen, the
Eighth Circuit later issued a clarification specifying that the injunction applied
only to the employer, not Blue Cross, the insurance provider. Henderson v.
Bodine Aluminum, Inc., No. 95-2469, 1995 WL 506941, at *1 (8th Cir. July 21,
1995).
9. Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 1995)
(per curiam).
10. See id. at 960-62.
11. See infra Part I.A, (discussing the controversy among patients,
insurance companies, and doctors over HCT/ABMT).
12. "[C]ases of this nature pose troubling social as well as ethical questions
that go well beyond the legal issues." Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18
F.3d 1405, 1412 (7th Cir. 1994). As one judge described it:
[Judges] are inspired and motivated by compassion as anyone would
be. Consequently, we often must remind ourselves that in our official
capacities, we have authority only to issue rulings within the narrow
parameters of the law and the facts before us. ... [In denying
coverage,] no personal satisfaction is taken, but that the law was
followed.
Harris v. Mutual of Omaha, No. 92-1089-C, 1992 WL 421489, at *1 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 26, 1992).
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nation in a health insurance plan challenges courts, ethicists, and
practitioners alike. 3 The court in Henderson v. Bodine Alumi-
num, Inc.,'4 committed itself to taking on this challenge.
This Note considers whether an insurer's denial of coverage of
HCT/ABMT for breast cancer discriminates against women. Part
I provides an overview of the relevant contract issues and the
controversy surrounding HCT/ABMT for breast cancer. Part II
examines the status of insurance benefits under Title VII and
considers whether a cause of action under Title VII should exist for
breast cancer patients whose health insurance, a benefit of
employment, excludes coverage for HCT/ABMT. This Part
compares the applicability of two types of Title VII analysis and
discusses potential legal arguments for both plaintiffs and
defendants. Part III proposes a method for measuring the validity
of the policy by asking whether a health insurance plan requires
women to bear the burden of health risk. This Note concludes that
plaintiffs should have a valid cause of action under Title VII and
that such claims will not result in providing special legal status for
women's health concerns.
I. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS AGAINST THE TERMS OF
INSURANCE BENEFITS
The transition in litigation over HCT/ABMT coverage from
contract to civil rights law reflects the endurance of the issues at
stake. Their complexity requires an appreciation of the status of
HCT/ABMT with patients and physicians and within the many
institutions, including the legal community and the insurance
industry, that grapple with the problem.
A. PERSPECTIVES ON HCT/ABMT FOR BREAST CANCER
The medical communityhas described HCT/ABMT as a state-
of-the-art treatment, a last resort attempt at prolonging life, and
an unproven experimentation. 5 Whatever the characterization,
it is a complex,'6 risky,' and particularly expensive" treat-
13. See infra Part I.B. (discussing insurance industry standards and their
potential for discrimination).
14. 70 F.3d 958, 960-62 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
15. Nancy A. Wynstra, Breast Cancer: Selected Legal Issues, 74 CANCER
491, 492-93 (Supp. 1994).
16. The program to which doctors referred Henderson begins with four
cycles of standard chemotherapy over four months. Appellants' Appendix, supra
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ment for a common, life-threatening disease. 9 The treatment
itself is two-fold, involving high dosage chemotherapy to fight the
cancer and a more expensive bone marrow transplant to prevent
the chemotherapy from killing the patient." Due to the risks
associated with the treatment, physicians usually do not contem-
plate prescribing it unless the patient has a bleak prognosis and
note 1, at 44 (Ratkin Aff. Ex. 2). Once the blood count returns to normal, a
hospital admits her for the bone marrow harvest, involving withdrawal of
approximately one quart of bone marrow through her hip bones. Id. at 48. In
addition, peripheral blood progenitor cells (white blood cells) are collected from
her blood samples in a blood cell separator by a process called leukapheresis.
Id. at 49. The bone marrow and white blood cells are frozen and stored while
she undergoes the HCT process, an intensive dosage of the same drugs she had
taken before, but with much more serious side effects expected. Id. After four
days of HCT therapy, the bone marrow and peripheral blood cells are reinfused
into her body, with the goal of having them repopulation. Id. at 48-49.
17. Of 68 women treated with HCT/ABMT for metastatic breast cancer in
one medical center, 13% died as a result of the treatment, and 69% died of
breast cancer within 22 months of the treatment. R.A. Saez et al., Autologous
Bone Marrow Transplantation for Metastatic Breast Center, 87 J. OKLA. ST.
MED. ASS'N 405,405 (1994). Henderson was informed of a 10% risk of death as
a direct result of the therapy should she be randomized to the HCT/ABMT arm
of the trial. Appellants' Appendix, supra note 1, at 44 (Ratkin Aff. Ex. 2).
18. The cost of treatment ranges from $100,000 to $300,000. Richard S.
Saver, Note, Reimbursing New Technologies: Why Are the Courts Judging
Experimental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1111 (1992). The cost of
Henderson's participation in a randomized clinical trial was estimated at
between $65,000 and $100,000, but the chemotherapy drugs would have been
free of charge. Appellants' Appendix, supra note 1, at 8 (Compl. para. 28). The
overall cost of the procedure, however, is expected to drop. C. Faucher et al.,
Comparison of G-CSF-primed Peripheral Block Progenitor Cells and Bone
Marrow Auto Transplantation: Clinical Assessment and Cost-effectiveness, 14
BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 895, 897-99 (1994).
19. Experts estimate that over 10% of all women will develop breast cancer
during their lives. Wynstra, supra note 15, at 491. Breast cancer is the leading
cause of death for women in the United States. Id. Furthermore, breast cancer
is the most common form of cancer among women. Gabriel N. Hortobagyi &
Aman U. Buzdar, Current Status of Adjuvant Systemic Therapy for Primary
Breast Cancer: Progress and Controversy, 45 CA-CANCER J. FOR CLINICIANS 199,
199 (1995). Over 2,500 patients received autotransplants for breast cancer in
over 80 medical centers in the United States and Canada from 1989 to 1994.
IKS. Antman et al., Autotransplants for Breast Cancer in North America
(Meeting Abstract), 13 PROC. ANN. MEETING AM. SOC. CLINICAL ONCOLOGISTS
A69 (1994).
20. Henderson's consent form warned: "If you decide to participate, you
must realize that withdrawal from the study, once chemotherapy is started and
before the bone marrow transplantation is given, will result in your death."
Appellants' Appendix, supra note 1, at 52 (Ratkin Aff. Ex. 2). Because high
dosage chemotherapy destroys bone marrow, the transplantation is needed to
prevent the death that would result from the treatment. Id.
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meets stringent clinical criteria.2' Still, the promise that
HCT/ABMT offers as a more effective treatment than standard
chemotherapy is significant. Because the disease is so common, a
small improvement in the efficacy of a treatment can save tens of
thousands of lives per year.22 The medical community, however,
has not fully articulated a standard for determining whether
HCT/ABMT is either an experimental or an accepted medical
practice.2
Although cancer research remains active, controversies have
developed as researchers fine-tune treatments and wait for clinical
trial results.' The focus of current HCT/ABMT research com-
pares the effectiveness of standard doses with that of high doses of
the same drugs, rather than determining the validity of the
treatment itself.2 Clinicians have yet to complete the final stage
of research, Phase IV randomized trials, on HCT/ABMT for breast
cancer.2 Patients may, however, bypass the randomization
21. Poor prognosis Stage IV (metastatic) breast cancer patients have at best
a 10% survival rate with conventional chemotherapy. F.R. Dunphy et al.,
Factors Predicting Long-term Survival for Metastatic Breast Cancer Patients
Treated with High-dose Chemotherapy and Bone Marrow Support, 73 CANCER
2157, 2157 (1994). The treatment strategy for breast cancer is a highly
individualized process, and research may prove that HCT/ABMT is optimal for
only a subgroup of breast cancer patients. See generally Charles H. Weaver et
al., High-dose Chemotherapy and Autologous Stem Cell Transplantation for
Breast Cancer, in TECHNICAL & BIOLOGICAL COMPONENTS OF MARROW
TRANSPLANTATION 59, 62-71 (C. Dean Buckner & R.A. Clift eds., 1995)
(discussing the factors that correlate with effectiveness of HCT/ABMT among
breast cancer patients).
22. Hortobagyi & Buzdar, supra note 19, at 199.
23. See generally Angela R. Holder, Funding Innovative Medical Treatment,
57 ALB. L. REV. 795, 806 (1994) (discussing the ambiguity of the legal definition
of "accepted medical practice"); Saver, supra note 18, at 1097 (discussing why
unsophisticated definitions of "experimental medicine" prevail).
24. Hortobagyi & Buzdar, supra note 19, at 205-21 (providing an overview
of the current clinical trial results related to breast cancer research and the
controversies and questions that remain).
25. This focus is common to studies under Phase IV clinical trials, whose
goal is typically to compare the results of promising treatments with the results
of conventional treatments. Denise S. Wolf, Who Should Pay for "Experimental"
Treatments? Breast Cancer Patients v. Their Insurers, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2029,
2041-42 (1995) (describing the goals of clinical trials from Phase I to Phase IV).
26. Id. at 2043. Such clinical trials are currently underway at several
research institutions, including the University of Pennsylvania Cancer Center,
the Mayo Clinic, the San Antonio Cancer Institute, and the New England
Medical Center. Id. at 2043 n.99. Henderson's treatment is conducted at
Barnes Hospital of St. Louis under the aegis of the National Cancer Institute.
Appellants' Appendix, supra note 1, at 19 (Ratkin Aff. para. 5). The goal of the
program is to compare results of standard doses of chemotherapy, including one
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process and enroll directly into treatment." Indeed, many
women refuse to participate in the randomized trials that would
prove the treatment's efficacy because they fear ending up in the
control group.'m This consequence necessarily slows the verifica-
tion of the treatment's efficacy.
B. MEDICAL TREATMENTS AND GROUP INSURANCE
Intensifying the controversy over HCT/ABMT's efficacy as an
accepted medical practice is the potential discrimination involved
in the insurance industry's traditional classification practices.29
As the industry increases its involvement in rationing health
care,"0 it faces the often conflicting imperatives of keeping costs
down and avoiding discriminatory allocations."' Insurers tradi-
tionally classify individuals according to risk data that highly
correlate with suspect classifications such as sex.12 Such classifi-
"investigational agent" provided free of charge, with intensive HCT/ABMT doses
of the same drugs. Id. at 44 (Ratkin Aff. Ex. 2).
27. See Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 591 (E.D. Va.
1990) (listing 15 major medical centers that use HCT/ABMT to treat breast
cancer).
28. Participation in a randomized trial means that the patient cannot know
whether she actually will receive HCT/ABMT treatment. For documentation of
patients' reluctance to participate in such trials, see Kara Smigel, Women Flock
to ABMT for Breast Cancer Without Final Proof, 87 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 952,
952-55 (1994).
29. Seegenerally BANKS McDOWELL, THE CRISIS IN INSURANCE REGULATION
96 (1994) (discussing regulation issues and describing the nature of group
health insurance and its potential for discrimination); see also Samuel
Marcosson, Who Is "Us" and Who Is "Then"--Common Threads and the
Discriminatory Cut-Off of Health Care Benefits for AIDS Under ERISA and the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 44AM. U. L. REV. 361,405-20 (1994) (analyzing
the applicability of the ADA to classifications within insurance contracts and
concluding that group insurance principles allow no justification for discrimina-
tory classifications because they are not based on generalizations about risk);
Philip G. Peters, Health Care Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 491,
500-02 (1995) (describing the discriminatory implications inherent in medical
care allocation); H. Miriam Farber, Note, Subterfuge: Do Coverage Limitations
and Exclusions in Employer-provided Health Care Plans Violate the Americans
with Disabilities Act?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850-915 (1994) (considering whether
the exemption under the ADA for traditional insurance practices allows insurers
to make discriminatory classifications within health insurance plans).
30. See MCDOWELL, supra note 29, at 106-07 (noting that insurers are
forced to deal with ethical issues they are neither professionally competent nor
ethically inclined to resolve).
31. Id. at 113.
32. This is especially true with respect to setting premium levels for life
insurance. See id. at 31, 160 (describing one of the goals of insurance
regulation as the avoidance of discrimination even where "discriminatory"
950
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cations, however, fundamentally differ from group health insur-
ance principles.33 While the industry bases individual insurance
on the notion that individuals assume financial responsibility for
their own risk, it grounds group underwriting on the principle that
low-risk classes subsidize their high-risk counterparts within the
group. 4 When each member of the group pays the same premi-
um, group insurance systems avoid the classification problems
inherent in other types of insurance. 5 On the other hand, a
decision not to fund a particular treatment for a particular disease
often will impact one class within the pool of beneficiaries more
severely than others.36
The insurance industry is not inclined to fund research, nor
does the public expect it to do so.3 Accordingly, most insurance
plans contain an exclusionary provision that expressly precludes
coverage for experimental treatments. Although insurance
companies originally intended such provisions to "protect [them-
selves] against the occasional odd-ball or maverick medical
classifications realistically reflect actuarial risk data).
33. See id. at 97 (calling health insurance "an assessment policy instead of
one written on the basis of risk for refined classes of members); see also
Marcosson, supra note 29, at 410-20 (contrasting the nature of group insurance
principles with traditional insurance practices, including underwriting,
classifying, and assessing risk).
34. See MCDOWELL, supra note 29, at 95-100 (describing the nature of
group health insurance underwriting and risk management). For the Supreme
Court's articulation of the concept of risk in health insurance, see Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 (1978) ("W]hen
insurance risks are grouped, the better risks always subsidize the poorer risks.
Healthy persons subsidize medical benefits for the less healthy .... Treating
different classes of risks as though they were the same for purposes of group
insurance is a common practice that has never been considered inherently
unfair."); cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAwS 334 (1992) (arguing that "[a]ny voluntary
insurance plan will disintegrate if some individuals find that they have to pay
more in coverage than they expect to receive in benefits").
35. MCDOWELL, supra note 29, at 97 (describing the difficulties insurers
have in keeping healthy members in the group and in maintaining a competi-
tive premium rate).
36. See infra notes 57, 104 (discussing the ADA and its provisions for
traditional insurance practices whose classifications may result in discrimi-
nation against disabled individuals).
37. MCDOWELL, supra note 29, at 110-11 (describing the effects of pressure
to keep medical costs down on funding for medical research and development);
Wolf, supra note 25, at 2046-54 (discussing insurers' refusal to fund science).
But see Saver, supra note 18, at 1129-31 (encouraging private funding of clinical
trials while avoiding a shift of all research costs onto third-party payers).
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therapy,""8 they increasingly have used these exclusionary
clauses to control costs.3 9
C. LITIGATION OF INSURANCE COVERAGE OF HCT/ABMT FOR
BREAST CANCER UNDER CONTRACT LAW
From 1988 to 1994, at least sixteen cases involved plaintiffs
seeking payment for HCT/ABMT under a theory of breach of
contract,40 the most notorious resulting in an almost ninety
million dollar award.4' During those years, insurance plans
typically excluded experimental or investigational treatment,
often without defining "experimental."42 On a case-by-case basis,
insurance administrators interpreted policies with similar
provisions both to require and to allow denial of HCT/ABMT.43
38. Barbara A. Fisfis, Comment, Who Should Rightfully Decide Whether a
Medical Treatment Necessarily Incurred Should Be Excluded from Coverage
Under a Health Insurance Policy Provision Which Excludes from Coverage
"Experimental" Medical Treatments?, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 777, 778-79 (1993)
(citation omitted).
39. "The primary reason insurers seek to exclude experimental medical
treatments from coverage under health insurance policies is to limit their
financial liability and keep the cost of insurance down." Id. at 780; see also
Holder, supra note 23, at 796 ("Since insurance companies are motivated to
refuse payment for any and all expensive treatments on whatever grounds they
can find, each year insurance contracts include more restrictive definitions of
which treatments are covered.").
40. Wynstra, supra note 15, at 491-504 (charting and analyzing the issues
and results of these cases). Several other sources have thoroughly documented
and analyzed cases falling under contract law. See, e.g., John A. Bourdeau,
Annotation, Propriety of Denial of Medical or Hospital Benefits for Investigative,
Educational, or Experimental Medical Procedures Pursuant to Exclusion
Contained in ERISA-governed Health Plan, 122 A.L.R. FED. 1 (1994) (providing
taxonomy of courts' affirmation or reversal of insurance exclusions for
experimental treatment in general under ERISA plans).
41. Ajury in California awarded $77 million in punitive damages and $12.1
million in compensatory damages, largely stemming from the insurer's inherent
conflict of interest which caused it to succumb to economic pressures to deny
coverage. California Jury Orders HMO to Pay $90 Million to Estate of Cancer
Victim, 3 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 18 (Jan. 6, 1994) (citing Fox v. Health Net of
California, No. 219692, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1993)).
42. See generally Fisfis, supra note 38, at 783-91 (describing scenarios that
patients face when they seek coverage for what their insurers call experimental
treatment, depending on whether and how "experimental" is defined in the
policy).
43. See William P. Peters & Mark C. Rogers, Variation in Approval by
Insurance Companies of Coverage forAutologous Bone Marrow Transplantation
for Breast Cancer, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 473, 473 (1994) (concluding that the
"predetermination process as applied to patients receiving care in clinical
research trials of cancer therapy was arbitrary and capricious"); Wolf, supra
note 25, at 2046-57 (describing divergent positions on HCT/ABMT among
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Courts faced with requests for injunctions and findings of breach
had to decide whether the insurance company still should consider
a particular treatment experimental 4 or whether the insurer
could have reached its conclusion in good faith.45 At least one
commentator has criticized the courts' results as "arbitrary and
capricious."46 From these cases emerged a duty upon insurers to
take reasonable steps to reconsider the experimental status at the
time of the plaintiffs application before reaching a coverage
determination.47
Because the rules of contract interpretation in ambiguous
insurers and noting that many believe that denials based on experimental
status "are really a pretext for insurers to evade coverage").
44. Compare Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 757 F. Supp. 661, 674-76 (D.
Md. 1991) (concluding the treatment is not experimental after considering
quality of life factors affecting the patient) with Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan,
688 F. Supp. 590, 596 (S.D. Ala. 1988) (upholding insurer's decision to deny
coverage ofHCT/ABMTbecause ofits experimental status). For more examples,
see Norman Newman, Don't Let a Court Interpret Your Plan, 11 BUS. & HEALTH
61, 62 (1993) (discussing the Third Circuit's de novo review of whether a liver
and pancreas transplant was experimental for pancreatic cancer in Heasley v.
Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249 (3rd Cir. 1993)); Wolf, supra note 25, at
2035-36, 2054-86 (discussing federal district and circuit court split on whether
insurers must pay for the treatment). Under contract law, the issue was
whether the terms of the insurance contract defined "experimental" in such a
way that the treatment reasonably fell within the definition. Wolf, supra note
25, at 2036.
45. See, e.g., Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 24 F.3d 118, 124 (10th
Cir. 1994) (remanding the case in part because the district court "failed to
articulate a standard of review and address Blue Cross's decision to deny
benefits"); White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418, 1422 (W.D. Mo. 1991)
(holding that because the insurer failed to execute reasonable efforts to research
the treatment, its denial of HCT-ABMT was arbitrary and capricious), affd, 985
F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1991); Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 764 F. Supp 728, 733
(D. Conn. 1991) (finding that the coverage denial was arbitrary and capricious
because vague terms gave the insurer a "floating standard which can rise or fall
in any fact situation").
46. See, e.g., Saver, supra note 18, at 1113 (arguing that the judicial
response to the nature of the treatment has been "characteristically haphazard"
and noting the "grab bag of different standards" courts have used in making
divergent determinations, from doctors' prescriptions, to expert testimony, to
anecdotal reports).
47. Compare Hasty v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas, 851 F. Supp. 1250,
1258-59 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (holding that the insurer's denial was not arbitrary
because it had made reasonable efforts to research the current status of the
treatment) with White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418, 1421-22 (W.D.
Mo.) (holding that because the insurer chose to "bury its head in the sand"
rather than consider scientific updates, its denial of HCT/ABMT coverage was
arbitrary and capricious), affd, 985 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1991).
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insurance cases often slant in favor of plaintiffs," the insurance
industry had a strong incentive to redraft its contracts.49 Explicit
terms began to appear in the policies, typically enumerating those
treatments they would exclude as experimental or investiga-
tional.5" This development solved the problem of defining "exper-
imental" and ostensibly had the added virtue of providing notice to
policyholders, who in theory could choose an alternate policy.5'
Breast cancer patients found themselves without recourse if
their physicians referred them to an unaffordable treatment
explicitly excluded by their insurance plans.5 2 With media
attention increasingly addressing the plight of breast cancer
patients, a few women attempted to persuade and even to shame
their insurers into paying for the treatment.5' Because most
48. This legal standard depends on the type of insurance involved, whether
public-payer, private-payer, or self-insured plans. See Saver, supra note 18, at
1098-1106 (comparing the standard under public-entitlement programs like
Medicaid, which defer to administrators' definitions, with that under private
insurance contracts, which favor construing ambiguous language against the
insurer in a contract of adhesion).
49. Newman, supra note 44, at 61 (arguing that employers whose medical
plans exclude experimental treatments "are legally better protected if they
define the scope of the exclusion rather than leave interpretation to a court");
Insurers Can Expect "Explosion" of Suits Seeking "Experimental" Coverage, 3
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 486 (Apr. 14, 1994) (advising insurers to "tailor their
contracts to the clues" in case law, to incorporate the criteria for determining
a procedure to be experimental, and to describe their decision-making process).
50. For an example of a typical plan with a blanket exclusion of experimen-
tal treatment, see Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 590, 593 n.2
(S.D. Ala. 1988) ("Basic coverage: No benefits shall be provided... whether or
not recommended or prescribed by a physician ... [for] [a]ny treatment or
procedure, medical or surgical, or any facilities, drugs, drug usage, equipment,
or supplies which are Experimental or Investigative."). Alternative plans either
append exceptions to a rule of inclusion or exclusion, or simply list what they
will not cover.
51. See David M. Eddy, The Individual v. Society, 265 JAMA 1446 (1991)
(hypothesizing a health plan where female beneficiaries choose to maximize
benefit to the group by foregoing coverage for HCT/ABMT and applying the
same estimated cost to screening procedures such as mammography instead).
But see Wolf, supra note 25, at 2057 & nn.191-93 (noting that it is unrealistic
to expect insureds to be aware of the complete terms of complex insurance
policies). Explicit exclusions as opposed to blanket exclusions have their
disadvantages as well. See Wolf, supra note 25, at 2048-49 (noting, among
other disadvantages, the risk that specific exclusions may result in legislatively
mandated coverage of the excluded treatment).
52. See supra note 18 (discussing the cost of HCT/ABMT).
53. See, e.g., Robert Russo, I'll Have to Sell the House to Pay for Treatment,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1994, at A20 (describing in a letter to the editor the
financial, emotional and physical burdens his insurer's denial of HCT-ABMT for
his wife's breast cancer placed on the family); A Woman Copes With New Breast
954
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Americans receive health insurance through their employers,54
however, employment law provided an alternative battle
ground.55 Thus in 1994, plaintiffs whose insurers had denied
payment for treatment began to bring the first discrimination-
based lawsuits into federal court.5"
Cancer Treatment (Morning Edition, National Public Radio Broadcast, Nov. 8,
1994) (documenting the steps one family took while awaiting its insurer's
eventual decision to fund HCT-ABMT).
54. MCDOWELL, supra note 29, at 102.
55. Once health insurance becomes a "benefit of employment," the plan is
regulated by ERISA. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. § 1144 (1988). Although ERISA neither mandates benefits nor prohibits
discriminatory practices in providing benefits, plan participants receive a right
to a cause of action for discrimination under Title VII and the ADA as a result
of the "benefit." Thus, although ERISA preempts the several symbolic laws
enacted by states as a result of the HCT/ABMT controversy, see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.4236 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-29-3.3 (1995); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 32A, § 17A (Law. Co-op 1994); MINN. STAT. § 62A.307 (1995); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-c (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-36.2 (1994); VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:1 (Michie 1994); Act of May 9, 1995, ch. 100, 1995 N.J.
Sess. Law Serv. 316 (West), the "benefit" of an employer-provided health
insurance plan has become a new testing ground to force insurers to pay for
HCT/ABMT-type treatments.
56. Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., exemplifies this current trend.
70 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Other lawsuits have presented
the same legal theory on the same or similar facts. See, e.g., Pokorney v. Miami
Valley Career Technology Sch. Dist., No. C-3-94-247, slip op. at 1-2, 7, 11 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 14, 1995) (overruling employer's motion to dismiss ADA claim based
on denial of medical treatment coverage but dismissing ADA claim against
insurer because it is not a covered entity); Reger v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869, 872-
73 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that the decision of the Office of Personnel
Management to exclude HCT/ABMT from coverage did not violate Title VII
because the plan excluded the treatment for all but five listed cancers, and this
broad exclusion therefore affected men and women equally); Dodd v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Ass/n, 835 F. Supp. 888, 891 (E.D. Va. 1993) (rejecting breast
cancer patient's claim that plan violated ADA); see also Wolf, supra note 25, at
2086-89 (discussing other litigation presenting the same theory); Dave Lenckus,
Experimental Coverage: Civil Rights Law Is Latest Twist in Cancer Treatment
Fight, Bus. INS., Aug. 14, 1995, at 40 (citing a federal district court in Eugene,
Oregon, that granted a preliminary injunction forcing insurer to pay for
HCT/ABMT for a breast cancer treatment); Christine Woolsey, Denial or
Discrimination? Patients Turn to ADA to Receive Controversial Treatments,
Bus. INS., June 26, 1995, at 2 (explaining the significance of the Henderson
case); Christine Woolsey, Discrimination Alleged: EEOC Probing Denial of
Coverage for Cancer Treatments, Bus. INS., Aug. 1, 1994, at 2 [hereinafter
Woolsey, Discrimination Alleged] (reporting on the EEOC investigation of Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Missouri regarding the standard the insurer uses for
determining that HCT/ABMT is experimental for breast cancer but not other
cancers.
Most relevant discrimination claims are brought under the ADA. See, e.g.,
Polifko v. King, No. 94-05, 1995 WL 33981, at *2 (EEOC Jan. 4, 1995). While
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II. THE SEARCH FOR EQUAL TREATMENT IN HEALTH
INSURANCE TERMS UNDER TITLE VII:
COMPARING THE APPROPRIATE CLASSES
Plaintiffs are unlikely to maintain a disparate treatment
cause of action except where there is intent to discriminate. The
lack of mutually exclusive classes, the blur between disease and
treatment, and the legal anomaly that would result if courts
accepted the theory preclude basing a case on disparate treatment
precedent notable for its clear-line classifications.57 A plaintiff's
prima facie case of sex discrimination under traditional disparate
impact theory must demonstrate that an identifiable employment
policy created a disparate impact upon one gender's compen-
sation.58 Disparate impact analysis thus becomes applicable to
the denial of treatment in an employer-provided insurance plan for
a disease that overwhelmingly affects women. As with disparate
treatment analysis, however, the requirements under disparate
impact present plaintiffs with significant evidentiary and theore-
tical hurdles.
A. TITLE VII DISPARATE TREATMENT AND DISPARATE IMPACT
ANALYSES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers
from discriminating on the basis of sex with respect to health
insurance benefits.59 Courts have since applied two different
the ADA carved out an exception for the insurance industry and its traditional
classification-based practices, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. V 1993), it is
uncertain how broadly the courts will interpret that exception. Farber, supra
note 29, at 876-80.
57. See infra notes 86-88, 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing the
rulings of Manhart and Norris).
58. See infra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing whether disparate
impact analysis applies to an alleged § 703(a)(1) violation).
59. Title VII prohibits sex-based discrimination with respect to "compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1988). Courts have interpreted fringe benefits as "compensation" under Title
VII and under the EEOC guidelines. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (1995) (prohibiting
discrimination with regard to fringe benefits in the same manner as compen-
sation). These guidelines define fringe benefits to include "medical, hospital,
accident, life insurance and retirement benefits." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(a) (1995).
The courts accord great deference to administrative guidelines by the EEOC.
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
The broad language of § 703(a)(1) of Title VII prohibits an employer from
discriminating against employees with respect to compensation and the terms
of employment, while § 703(a)(2) specifically prohibits discriminatory limitations
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analytical models to determine discrimination under Title VII:
disparate treatment and disparate impact.6" In a disparate
treatment case, the plaintiff must prove that the employer
intentionally discriminated by treating members of one gender
differently than similarly situated members of the other gender.61
Courts apply disparate impact analysis, however, where a facially
neutral employment practice 2 impacts one gender more severely
than the other.6" Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
of discrimination under either theory, the burden of production
shifts to the employer to articulate a defense.'
The level of proof that courts require for such a defense
depends on whether the claim is based on disparate treatment or
disparate impact. In a disparate treatment case, the burden of
production shifts to the employer, who need only produce evidence
of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason behind its employment
and classifications that deprive individuals of employment opportunities. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1988). Section 703(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex.
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees.., in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's... sex.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
60. See generally SUSAN M. OMILIAN & JEAN P. KAMP, SEX-BASED
EMPLoYMENT DISCRAIMNATION § 11.10 (1995) (discussing proof of discrimination
under Title VII).
61. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-06 (1973)
(discussing the allocation of the burden of proof for a prima facie case of
disparate treatment); see also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742,
2754 (1993) ("It is not enough to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must
believe the plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimination."); CHARLES A.
SULLIVAN ET AL., 1 EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION § 5.4.1, at 253-54 (2d ed.
1988) ("Tiscriminatory intent' ranges from animus to stereotyped assumptions
and unconscious perceptions.").
62. The first element of a prima facie case of disparate impact, identifying
an employment practice, has been a matter of recent controversy. The Ninth
Circuit has ruled, for example, that an employer's reliance on competitive
market prices in setting wages cannot be labeled an employment policy.
Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 706 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1036 (1984), overruled by Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477
(9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
63. Absence of intent is not a defense in a disparate impact case. See infra
notes 67-74, 94-98 (discussing disparate impact analysis).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (disparate impact); Hicks,
113 S. Ct. at 2747 (disparate treatment).
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decision.6" Conversely, in a disparate impact case, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 places the burden of persuasion of the defense
on the employer.66 Moreover, the Bennett amendment to the
Civil Rights Act incorporated into Title VII the affirmative
defenses to an Equal Pay Act claim.67 As a result, if the claim of
discrimination concerns unequal compensation, the employer may
65. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (providing a framework for
allocating the burden of proof in a disparate treatment case). Burden shifting
has been a topic of controversy and development in the Supreme Court and
Congress. In a disparate treatment case, the current standard is found in
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747 (holding that while the burden of production shifts to
the employer to articulate a defense after the plaintiffs prima facie case, the
burden of proof remains at all times with the plaintiff); see also U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM,
THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION, app. 2, at 4-8 (1995) (explaining that the Hicks
analysis only applies to disparate treatment cases relying on circumstantial
proof of discriminatory intent, not in cases where intent may be proved
directly).
66. For disparate impact cases, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 legislatively
overruled the Supreme Court ruling in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989), that the burden of persuasion never shifts from the
plaintiff. The 1991 amendment places the burden of production and persuasion
of the existence of a defense on the employer:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if-{I) a complaining party
demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice
that causes a disparate impact on the basis of .... sex ... and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993). Section 104 of the 1991 Act defines
"demonstrate" to mean 'meets the burdens of production and persuasion." For
a commentator's views regarding the significance of the 1991 amendments
relating to employers' defenses, see generally Steven R. Greenberger, A
Productivity Approach to Disparate Impact and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 72
OR. L. REv. 253, 298 (1993) (discussing the legislative history regarding how to
define the employer's business necessity defense in the 1991 Civil Rights Act
and concluding that "rather than resolving its disagreement as to the stringence
[sic] of the business necessity defense, Congress simply codified it").
67. Under the Equal Pay Act, a wage differential between male and female
employees performing equal work is permissible only "where such payment is
made pursuant to (I) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential
based on any other factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
The Bennett Amendment to Title VII provides that "[i]t shall not be an
unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to
differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or
compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [§ 6(d) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988)]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1988).
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justify the discrepancy if it is based on "any factor other than
sex.""8 It remains uncertain whether such a factor must be a
motivating factor 9 or to what extent factors highly correlated
with sex function as a "factor other than sex."7"
If the employer establishes a defense under either theory, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who then must prove that the
defense represents a mere pretext for discrimination. 7 In
codifying the allocation of the burden of proof in a disparate impact
case, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides two alternative
strategies for the plaintiff's rebuttal.72 The plaintiff may rebut
either by attacking the employer's showing of business necessity
or by demonstrating the existence of an alternative employment
practice that the employer refused to adopt.7"
Biological differences between men and women have triggered
several employment discrimination cases74 that illustrate the
courts' difficulty classifying an employment policy as either
68. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988); see Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161,
166-68 (1981) (holding that the Equal Pay Act defenses apply to a Title VII
discrimination case involving sex-based wage discrimination that does not fall
under the Equal Pay Act).
69. If sex is one motivating factor among many, it nevertheless violates
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993).
70. See EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249,253 (6th Cir.1988) (holding
the business necessity defense as the benchmark for evaluating the "factor other
than sex" defense and upholding the employer's "head of household" require-
ment for spousal insurance coverage as a valid "factor other than sex"). In J.C.
Penney the court reasoned that employment decisions regarding fringe benefits
often impacted classes of employees along lines highly correlated with sex, but
that this would not "detract from a showing of a legitimate belief that the
benefits offered would be an appropriate and non-sex based incentive to attract,
satisfy and retain employees." Id. at 254.
71. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,804 (1973) (developing
the rebuttal stage in a disparate treatment case); Wambheim v. J.C. Penney
Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (discussing the rebuttal
stage in a disparate impact case). In Wambheim, the court noted "[e]vidence
that the policy was a pretext might include proof of past intentional discrimi-
nation ... or proof that an alternative policy would serve the employer's
legitimate interests with less disparate impact." Id. at 1495 (citing United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), (C) (Supp. V 1993).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (Supp. V 1993); see Greenberger, supra note
66, at 299-302 (discussing the ambiguities of this section, despite Congress's
intent to respond to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).
74. See generally OMILLAN & KAMP, supra note 60, § 11:09 (discussing the
distinction between the "differences approach" and the "inequality approach" to
sex discrimination).
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disparate treatment or disparate impact. Pregnancy discrimi-
nation provided the Supreme Court with its first conundrum. In
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Court held that discrimination
based on pregnancy did not violate Title VII.75 Gilbert involved
a fringe benefit plan that paid a wage substitute to employees
absent from work due to disabilities, while explicitly excluding
pregnancy as a disability.76 The Court held that disparate
treatment analysis did not apply to classifications based on
pregnancy because the classification is not drawn between men
and women but between pregnant women and all others, including
men and nonpregnant women." The Court rejected arguments
based on the disparate impact theory because female employees
drew more from the fringe benefit plan as a whole than did men
did.7
8
Congress overruled Gilbert in 1978 by passing the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA).79 The PDA redefined the phrase
"because of sex" for Title VII purposes to include discrimination"or
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions." ° In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, the Supreme Court applied disparate treatment analysis
in response to plaintiff's claim that limited coverage of pregnancy
benefits for spouses of male employees violated the PDA.8"
Noting the PDA's effect on the reasoning of Gilbert, the Court
recognized that the appropriate classification was not between
pregnant women and all others but "between persons who tace a
risk of pregnancy and those who do not." 2 In addition to the
75. 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
76. Id. at 128-29.
77. The Court noted that because the classification was not a facial
discrimination against women, a disparate treatment case could be proven only
if the plaintiff could "demonstrate that exclusion of pregnancy from the
compensated conditions is a mere [pretext] designed to effect an invidious
discrimination against the members of one sex." Id. at 136 (quoting Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding similar state disability insurance plan
under a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause challenge)).
78. Id. at 130 & n.10, 135.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
80. Id. The statute imposes a new standard for the treatment of women by
employers: "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes,
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." Id.
81. 462 U.S. 669, 683-85 (1983).
82. Id. at 678 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161-62 n.5
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
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specific context of pregnancy benefits, the Supreme Court has
found that the use of sex-based distinctions in insurance plans
violates Title VII." In Los Angeles Department of Water & Power
v. Manhart, treatment of women as "components ofa ... sexual...
class," rather than as individuals, fulfilled the necessary element
of intent.8 4 The Supreme Court also has ruled that, in the
insurance context, neither cost arguments85 nor reliance on
actuarial data may justify an impermissible classification. 6
83. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1081 (1983) (per curiam); Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708-09 (1978). In
Manhart, the employer required its female employees to make larger contri-
butions to a pension fund than male employees, along the rationale that women
as a class live longer than men and thus collect more from the pension in the
long run. 435 U.S. at 704. The Supreme Court held that to take into account
the sex of an employee in determining contribution levels into a benefit pension
plan was a violation of Title VII. Id. at 710-11. The Court clarified its holding
in Norris, where the benefits paid out to women under a pension plan were
lower than those paid to men, to show that the violation applied to differences
on the benefit side as well as the contribution side. 463 U.S. at 1081-82; see
generally OMILIAN & KAMP, supra note 60, § 16 (discussing cases relating to
discrimination in fringe benefits).
84. 435 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1978). The Manhart Court explained:
This case does not, however, involve a fictional difference between men
and women. It involves a generalization that the parties accept as
unquestionably true: Women, as a class do live longer than men....
The question, therefore, is whether the existence or nonexistence of
discrimination is to be determined by comparison of class characteris-
tics or individual characteristics. A "stereotyped" answer to that
question may not be the same as the answer that the language and
purpose of the statute command.
Id. In Manhart's reasoning, therefore, to make decisions according to class
distinctions rather than individual distinctions fulfills the discriminatory intent
element in a disparate treatment analysis. See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1082-83
(emphasizing that the threshold inquiry is whether the employer is treating its
employees as individuals or impermissibly as "components of a... sexual...
class").
85. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 685 n.26 ("[Allthough that type of cost
differential may properly be analyzed in passing on the constitutionality of a
State's health insurance plan, no such justification is recognized under Title VII
once discrimination has been shown.") (citation omitted).
86. The claim in Manhart was brought under the Equal Pay Act, whose
standard for justification of an unlawful classification authorizes a "differential
based on any other factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv) (1992).
Nevertheless, the Court did not find that longevity data qualified as such an
"other factor." Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710; cf id. at 727 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("The 'other factor other than sex' is longevity; sex is the umbrella-constant
under which all of the elements leading to differences in longevity are grouped
and assimilated, and the only objective feature upon which an employer-or
anyone else, including insurance companies-may reliably base a cost
differential for the 'risk' being insured.").
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Finally, while Title VII subjects employers to liability for a
discriminatory insurance policy,"7 courts remain split on whether
they also can hold insurance companies liable for discrimination
as "agents" of the employer.88
Courts rarely apply disparate impact analysis to alleged
discrimination in benefits. The Supreme Court never has ruled
whether disparate impact analysis applies to a claim ofdiscrimina-
tory fringe benefits, and lower courts have expressed confusion on
this point.89 In Gilbert, the Supreme Court did not analyze the
87. Norris, 463 U.S. at 1089 (noting that "the State cannot disclaim
responsibility for the discriminatory features of the insurers' options"); Manhart,
435 U.S. at 718 n.33 (stating that an employer may not "avoid [its] responsibili-
ties by delegating discriminatory programs to corporate shells"); see also EEOC
v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139, 1141 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that the employer
was liable for insurance carrier's discriminatory policies).
88. In Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association, the Second
Circuit held that an insurance company providing pension benefits to employers
was "so closely entwined" with the employers as to subject them to Title VII.
691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223
(1983), and modified on other grounds, 735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 881 (1984). On virtually identical facts, the Sixth Circuit came to the
opposite conclusion. Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 F.2d 235, 238 (6th Cir.
1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983); see generally Andrew 0. Schiff, Note, The
Liability of Third Parties Under Title VII, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 167, 180-85
(1984) (discussing the issue as related to insurance companies).
89. The disparate impact theory developed in cases where plaintiffs claimed
violations of § 703(a)(2), involving discrimination with respect to "employment
opportunities or... status as an employee." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1988).
Disparate impact analysis has thus been applied to such facially neutral policies
as intelligence testing, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1971),
height and weight requirements, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330
(1977), pregnancy leave requirements, Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
649 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1980), excluding applicants based on arrest records,
Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 632-33 (9th Cir.1972), and in-house
employee selection plans, Shidaker v. Carlin, 782 F.2d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 1986).
The circuit courts have split on whether disparate impact analysis applies
to a § 703(a)(1) claim. See SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 333 n.7 (discussing two
possible readings of Gilbert regarding the applicability of disparate impact
analysis to fringe benefit plans). In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, the Supreme
Court struck down a policy as violating § 703(a)(2) but, following Gilbert, upheld
a fringe benefit discrepancy involving pregnancy. 434 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1977).
In Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., the Ninth Circuit noted that although the
Supreme Court had not explicitly decided that disparate impact analysis is
appropriate in a § 703(a)(1) case, it had implied that such analysis may be
applied to such a claim. 705 F.2d 1492, 1494 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (citing
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982)). As a result, the court
concluded that disparate impact is appropriate in the § 703(a)(1) case. Id. Cf
EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that
federal district courts have applied disparate impact analysis without
considering whether the claim fell under § 703(a)(1) or § 703(a)(2)).
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situation under disparate impact because evidence indicated that
the compensation plan taken as a whole provided more to women
than it did to men. 0 It is unclear to what extent Gilbert requires
consideration of the compensation package as a whole, as opposed
to consideration of a specific discriminatory policy term.
In Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co.,9 the Ninth Circuit grap-
pled with this difficulty when it applied disparate impact analysis
to a "head of household" employment policy." Ruling that
Manhart does not control because disparate treatment was not at
stake," the court concluded that the cost differential of providing
benefits to male and female employees could constitute business
necessity so as to justify a facially neutral policy that had a
disparate impact upon women.94 In sum, whether the cost of
treatment may justify an insurance discrepancy that has a
discriminatory impact upon women hinges on whether the
particular fact situation warrants disparate treatment or dispa-
rate impact analysis.
B. DISPARATE TREATMENT ANALYSIS: BREAST CANCER AS A
DISCRIMINATORY CLASSIFICATION
Where employers intend to discriminate against women,
90. The Court stated:
The [d]istrict [clourt noted the evidence introduced during the trial, a
good deal of it stipulated, concerning the relative cost to General
Electric of providing benefits under the plan to male and female
employees, all of which indicated that, with pregnancy-related
disabilities excluded, the cost of the [p]lan to General Electric per
female employee was at least as high as, if not substantially higher
than, the cost per male employee.
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 130 (1976) (footnote omitted).
91. 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
92. This policy allowed insurance coverage of employees' spouses only if the
spouse earned less than the employee. Because female employees comprised the
bulk of the low-paying jobs at the company and thus tended to earn less than
their spouses, the policy had a disparate impact upon female employees: 12.5%
of the married female employees, as opposed to 89% of their male counterparts,
qualified as heads of household. Id. at 1493-94.
93. .Id. at 1495.
94. Id. The standard adopted for the employer's defense was to demon-
strate "legitimate and overriding business considerations." Id. at 1495 (quoting
Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984)). Cost was a permissible factor to be weighed
along with J.C. Penney's rationale that the rule was designed to provide
benefits where need was greatest. Id. at 1495.
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courts will employ disparate treatment analysis.95 In the case of
insurance coverage exclusions, however, the motivating factor is
more likely to be cutting costs than an intent to discriminate.96
Notwithstanding the insurance company's motivating factors,
however, sex-based classifications may themselves fulfill the
intent element in disparate treatment analysis. Such was the case
in Manhart where the employer, based on longevity statistics,
demanded higher retirement benefit contributions from women.
Consequently, courts first must determine whether a case places
a Manhart-type classification at stake.
It is counterintuitive to consider the term "breast cancer" as
gender-neutral. As such, exclusion of a treatment for breast
cancer is analogous to exclusion of pregnancy coverage under the
PDA.9" Plaintiffs therefore could argue that although the PDA
does not prohibit denial of coverage for breast cancer explicitly,
Congress intended to prohibit classifications based on conditions
that affect only women as well as the disparate treatment that
stems from such classifications.99 Excluding a treatment for
breast cancer while approving similar treatments for other cancers
constitutes disparate treatment of women.100
If the defendant employer cannot overcome this showing of
differential treatment, the justifications available to it are
95. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing a prima facie case
of disparate treatment and its intent element).
96. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing insurers'
increasing use of the "experimental" treatment clause to control the cost of
insurance).
97. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing Manhart as
a disparate treatment case).
98. See supra notes 79-82 (discussing the PDA and the Court's interpre-
tation of it).
99. Congress declared that the term "sex" in Title VII includes "pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). It seems
clear that "other related medical conditions" refers exclusively to reproductive
conditions and that no argument can be made that it includes breast cancer or
other women's diseases. Id.; see Maganuco v. Leyden Community High Sch.,
939 F.2d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the scope of the PDA is limited
to "policies which impact or treat medical conditions relating to pregnancy and
childbirth less favorably than other disabilities"). It is less clear whether
insurers who refuse to pay for fertility treatment or sophisticated and expensive
treatments relating to pregnancy are violating the PDA.
100. This line of reasoning links the Title VII analysis to analysis under the
ADA, which requires proof of discrimination against a particular disability, such
as breast cancer, or a class of disabilities such as. cancer. See supra note 56
(discussing the ADA).
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minimal.'' Manhart and Norris prevent cost or traditional
insurance practice arguments from justifying an impermissible
classification as a business necessity. 2 Strict readings of the
defense requirement in important precedents also appear to
preclude any affirmative defense of disparate treatment in this
case.
0 3
Defendants could claim, however, that the exclusion applies
to a specific treatment only. As long as breast cancer is but one
disease among many excluded from coverage for HCT/ABMT 04
and insurers exclude HCT/ABMT for diseases that affect men and
women alike, they arguably are not discriminating on the basis of
sex. '5 In Manhart, the Court held that discrimination resulted
from a plan that treated each woman "in a manner which but for
101. In International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the Supreme
Court declared that an employment policy, which excluded fertile women but
not men from jobs that would expose them to toxic agents, warranted disparate
treatment analysis as a sex classification. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). As for the
justification available once a plaintiff has demonstrated a discriminatory
classification, the Court noted: 'The beneficence of an employer's purpose does
not undermine the conclusion that an explicit gender-based policy is sex
discrimination under § 703(a) [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] and thus may be
defended only as a B[ona] F[ide] O[ccupational] Q[ualification]." Id. at 200. In
Manhart, even proof that the challenged policy had no discriminatory effect on
the protected class could not justify a classification which "on its face,
discriminated against every individual woman employed by the Department."
435 U.S. at 715.
102. See supra notes 66 (discussing the limitations imposed upon defenses
in disparate impact cases).
103. The statutory affirmative defense to disparate treatment is the bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988).
Because the exclusion of HCT/ABMT in an insurance policy cannot be
considered an occupational qualification, the defense cannot apply in this case.
See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199 (holding that the BFOQ defense is the
only available defense to an explicit gender-based policy).
104. Typically, the blanket term excludes the treatment, followed by a list
of exceptions. See supra note 50 (providing a typical exclusion provision).
Exceptions have included leukemia, Hodgkin's and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma,
neuroblastoma, and testicular, mediastinal retroperitoneal, and ovarian germ
cell tumors. Wolf, supra note 25, at 2048 n.124. In contrast, insurers have
refused to cover HCT/ABMT for ovarian cancer, testicular cancer, multiple
myeloma, cervical cancer, melanoma, lung cancer, brain cancer, soft tissue
cancer, prostate cancer, colon cancer, and AIDS. Id. at 2052 & nn.151-61.
105. This is the approach defendants facing discrimination claims under
ADA have used. The argument hinges on a distinction between exclusion of a
medical treatment and exclusion of a specific disease. Farber, supra note 29,
at 851 n.9 ("Under the ADA [exclusions of specific treatments] seems to be an
acceptable practice since they are facially neutral and do not involve an actual
disability-specific determination").
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[her] sex would [have been] different."" 6 Defendants could
argue that the plaintiffis not being treated in a manner which but
for her sex would have been different: if she were male she would
still face a risk of contracting a form of cancer for which
HCT/ABMT would be denied coverage.' Moreover, what made
the classification in Manhart discriminatory was that it included
individual women in a class based on an attribute that might not
apply to them.' ° Manhart insisted that Title VIIs focus be on
the individual. In contrast, while breast cancer patients are
classified without respect to their individual differences, °9
women as a class are not.
Defendants also may prevail by denying the existence of any
sex-based classification. Unlike pregnancy, breast cancer
occasionally occurs among males,"' which may preclude a
106. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711
(1978).
107. Plaintiffs encountering this argument may be required to provide
evidence of the relative demand for HCT/ABMT among each relevant form of
cancer along with the differential risk faced by each gender of contracting each
form of cancer. This is precisely what courts facing claims of discrimination
under ADA ask for. See, e.g., Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d
958, 960 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (granting plaintiffs request for a
preliminary injunction after plaintiff had established that HDCT for her type
of cancer had passed the experimental stage and that the insurance plan
provided the treatment for other comparable conditions); Polifko v. King, No. 94-
05, 1995 WL 33981, at *8 (EEOC Jan. 4, 1995) (requiring the insurance carrier
to provide information on what other conditions for which it denied HCT/ABMT
coverage and explain its decision).
108. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708 (explaining the attribute at issue as
longevity).
109. This classification by disease rather than by individual attributes,
moreover, runs contrary to medical practice, which ideally considers the
potential benefit of the treatment on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Weaver,
supra note 20, at 62-71 (discussing the many factors requiring consideration
before physicians should recommend HCT/ABMT for breast cancer).
110. Although breast cancer is overwhelmingly a women's disease,
approximately one percent of breast cancer cases occur among men. Beryl
Sandler et al., Cancer of the Male Breast, 60 AM. SURGEON 816, 816 (1994)
(stating that approximately 1000 new cases of male breast cancer and 300
resulting deaths occur each year). While the incidence of breast cancer among
men has remained stable, the rate for women is growing at an alarming pace.
When men do develop breast cancer, however, the prognosis, stage for stage,
and the incidence of aggressive forms of the disease are the same as for women.
Id. at 816-17. Moreover, although testing of the effectiveness of treatments like
HCT/ABMT upon male breast cancer patients is lacking due to the rarity of the
disease, researchers consider it appropriate to administer the same treatment
options for male as for female patients. Id. at 819.
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disparate treatment analysis."' Evidence relating to an insur-
ance company's classification of the treatment as experimental
may help the court to determine what comprises the classes. If, for
example, no medical data discussing HCT/ABMT forbreast cancer
involves male patients, this omission weakens defendant's
argument. Resolution of this issue will depend on the court's
disposition toward accepting statistical composition of a class as
opposed to an arguably "common sense" approach that concludes
that if men get breast cancer, breast cancer cannot signify
"female.""
If, however, the courts view breast cancer as a "women's
disease," defendants still have a stare decisis argument that the
reasoning in Gilbert may apply."3 By claiming that the PDA
only overruled Gilbert's reasoning with respect to the defining
terms of the act, "pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical
conditions," defendants could argue that Congress only declared
classifications by female reproductive capacities to be facial sex
classifications."' Outside of the context of reproduction, a
classification using the term "breast cancer" is not a classification
between men and women, but between those with breast cancer
and all other people, male and female."5 The extent to which the
111. See supra notes 61, 65 (discussing the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
requirements for disparate treatment). Manhart distinguished itself from
Gilbert and thus evaded the issue of whether Gilbert's class-drawing principles
applied, by noting that in Manhart, the groups are "composed entirely and
exclusively of members of the same sex." Manhart, 435 U.S. at 715. These
exclusive categories may be the key to whether Manhart's reasoning applies to
this case.
112. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
679 n.17 (1983) (quoting Senator Hawkins as stating that "it seems only
commonsense [sic], that since only women can become pregnant, discrimination
against pregnant people is necessarily discrimination against women.").
113. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (discussing the holding
and reasoning of Gilbert).
114. See supra note 77 (discussing classification under Gilbert).
115. This remains the framework for equal protection analysis of a
constitutional claim. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974) (holding
that exclusion from disability insurance protection was not invidious discrimi-
nation because the exclusion was between pregnant and non-pregnant people,
not women and men). To the extent that the challenged employment policy
involves a term of insurance, however, the reasoning of Newport News should
govern. In that case, the Court noted that in the insurance context, the benefit
provided is risk coverage. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678. That is, a plaintiff
must determine whether the health risks that women face are treated
measurably differently than the health risks that men face. Once again,
evidence of such a difference would face daunting statistical requirements.
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PDA overruled Gilbert remains open to debate."'
Finally, the employer defendant's policy argument must focus
on the anomalous result of disparate treatment analysis. If
"breast cancer" is a proxy for "female" and virtually no defense
applies, this would have the effect of singling out a "woman's
disease" for special treatment. Moreover, women with breast
cancer would have a remedy at law unavailable to women with a
form of cancer that affects both sexes.1 7 Considering the cir-
cumstances, the courts appear reluctant to develop a special legal
status for sex-specific diseases and disabilities under disparate
treatment analysis.
C. EVIDENTIARY HURDLES UNDER DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS
The first step under the disparate impact approach requires
identification of the employment policy at issue."8 Plaintiffs are
likely to make three alternate arguments. First, they could argue
that it is the employer's choice of an insurance package that has a
disparate impact upon women. This argument, however, appears
circular and bootstraps the employer into liability through the
definition of "policy." The employer in Manhart violated Title VII
by offering a discriminatory pension plan."9 An employer could
116. Cf Marcosson, supra note 29, at 407 (stating that the applicability of
Gilbert should also determine whether exclusion of AIDS benefits is discrimina-
tory).
117. This conclusion depends on how litigation of exclusions of HCT/ABMT
under the ADA will evolve. In particular, it depends on how broadly courts will
interpret the exemption for insurance industry practices. See supra notes 56,
100, 105 (discussing the insurance exemption under the ADA).
118. See, e.g., Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 409 (7th Cir.
1988) (holding that decision not to give a raise to majority female clerical
workers but only to majority male supervisors was not an employment policy);
cf Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1494 (9th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (finding an employment policy in the employer's decision to provide
spousal insurance coverage only to spouses earning less than the employee).
The Civil Rights Amendments of 1991 attempted to clarify the requirements for
identifying the employment policy:
With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice
causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(I), the
complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged
employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the
complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of
a respondent's decision[-]making process are not capable of separation
for analysis, the decision-making process may be analyzed as one
employment practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(I) (Supp. V 1993).
119. See supra notes 83-84, 101, 106-09, 111 and accompanying text
(discussing the significance of Manhart).
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distinguish that case, however, because the use of sex-based
actuarial tables to determine contribution levels was not an
employment policy but a classification that violated
§ 703(a)(2). 2 ' Thus it is not clear whether the employer's action
inManhart is analogous for purposes of the plaintiff's prima facie
case of a § 703(a)(1) violation. Next, plaintiffs could identify the
"policy" as a denial of HCT/ABMT for breast cancer. This argu-
ment, however, would require the plaintiff to hinge a claim on a
very attenuated decision-making process on the part of the
employer. Finally, plaintiffs could define the blanket denial of
HCT/ABMT coverage on the grounds that it is experimental as the
"policy." This alternative also labels a classification arguably far
removed from the employer's decision-making pro cess an "employ-
ment policy."
Proof of disparate impact also presents semantical problems.
On the one hand, plaintiffs could easily prove that an insurance
policy's exclusion of a treatment for breast cancer would
disproportionately impact women as opposed to men. 2' Like-
wise, exclusion of a specific treatment for cancer
disproportionately affects women if that treatment is mainly used
to treat breast cancer as opposed to other forms of the disease.'22
According to Gilbert, however, a plaintiff with a disparate impact
claim must prove that the compensation package, taken as a
whole, provides less to female employees than it does to male
employees. 1" Actuarial valuation of the compensation package
would thus become a difficult but necessary part of a prima facie
120. See supra notes 83-84 (discussing the holding and reasoning of
Manhart).
121. See supra note 110 (stating that less than one percent of breast cancer
patients are male).
122. Breast cancer has become the most common disease for which
HCT/ABMT is used. William P. Peters, High-dose Chemotherapy with
Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation for the Treatment of Breast Cancer:
Yes, in IMPORTANT ADVANCES IN ONCOLOGY 1995, at 215, 215 (Vincent T.
DeVita et al. eds., 1995).
123. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976). This is why the
Gilbert Court refused to employ a disparate impact analysis. Id. Defendants
demonstrated that women drew more out of the benefit package in spite of the
exclusion of pregnancy coverage. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text
(discussing the holding and reasoning of Gilbert). Treatment of disparate
impact under Gilbert is nonetheless complicated. See SuLLIVAN, supra note 61,
at 333 (noting that Gilbert can be read in two ways: either as refusing to apply
disparate impact analysis to fringe benefit plans, or as insisting that the entire
benefit package be considered, rather than particular components of the
package, for disparate impact).
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case.
124
Under the Newport News model, 25 female employees may
bring a claim based on the theory that the policy provides them
less coverage for their health risks than it does for male em-
ployees. Conversely, male employees whose spouses need
HCT/ABMT may claim discrimination because they receive less
health risk coverage for their dependents than do female em-
ployees. 126 Consequently, the gender of the plaintiff claiming
discrimination in the employment setting is not necessarily the
same gender against which the insurer discriminated.
Defendants may exploit this ostensible contradiction by
offering an alternate model for disparate impact analysis. Such a
model would focus on the family unit instead of on classes of
employees and, following Gilbert, on the health care package as a
whole.'27 InNewportNews, the special status offamily health care
as a benefit of employment turned limited coverage for pregnancy
into discrimination against male employees. 128 This finding was
possible because a discrepancy existed between pregnancy
coverage available to female employees and pregnancy coverage
available to male employees' spouses. 129 In contrast, no discrep-
124. See MCDOWELL, supra note 29, at 97 (describing the inherent
difficulties in determining the prorated value per beneficiary of a group
insurance plan).
125. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
676 (1983); see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing the holding
and reasoning of Newport News).
126. This approach would be necessary unless spouses of employees have
standing to bring claims under Title VII. Cf. Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum,
Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding likelihood of success on the merits
of her claim indicates the Eighth Circuit found that Henderson, as a spouse of
the employee and beneficiary of the employee fringe benefit, had standing to sue
under Title VII and ADA); Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 802, 804
(E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that male employee allegedly discharged due to the
pregnancy of his wife, a coworker, had standing to bring a Title VII claim).
127. Such a focus on health insurance as a family benefit is open to criticism
because it is based on assumptions reflecting an outmoded model of the labor
force, where women were primarily insured by their husbands' employers. See
CHARLOTTE F. MULLER, HEALTH CARE AND GENDER 58-70 (1990) (noting that
today two-thirds of women in the U.S. under 65 are in the labor force and that
women's status in the labor market is strongly linked with their access to
health care).
128. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676 (stating that "[u]nder the proper test
petitioner's plan is unlawful, because the protection it affords to married male
employees is less comprehensive than the protection it affords to married female
employees").
129. The EEOC stresses that the issue is not whether the plan treats two
groups of women the same, for example, female employees and wives of male
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ancy among classes of beneficiaries exists in a plan that excludes
HCT/ABMT for breast cancer. Under this model, the plan treats
male and female employees equally because for every female
employee who receives "less" risk coverage from the policy, there
is in theory her counterpart in the spouse of a male employee. The
married male employee benefits no more from a family health care
package than the married female employee does. Consequently,
it does not matter whether discrimination impacts males or
females as long as all employees receive the same package and are
married.
Ifthe plaintiffestablishes aprimafacie disparate impact case,
the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a
permissible justification. 30 In most disparate impact cases, the
employer can accomplish this only by proving that the practice
was "job related ... and consistent with business necessity."' 3'
If the employment practice concerns compensation, however, the
standard for business necessity is met if the practice is based on
"any factor other than sex."' 32 The employer would merely have
to show that the insurer classifies HCT/ABMT as an experimental
treatment for breast cancer. Refusal to fund research is the
justifying motivation, clearly a factor other than sex. Further-
more, a simple argument that the treatment is too costly also
would probablyjustify the policy. This justification is permissible
because no classification has taken place.
1 3
Once the employer justifies the policy, the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff for rebuttal. Before the Civil Rights Act of
employees, but whether the plan gives the same level of coverage for medical
conditions to spouses of male and of female employees. EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 app. at 206 (1995) (Question
No. 22).
130. See supra notes 62-63, 66-67 and accompanying text (describing the
standard for defense of a prima facie case of disparate impact).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(I) (Supp. V 1993); see supra notes 66-68
(discussing the business necessity defense and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
amendments).
132. See supra note 67 (discussing the Bennett amendment's incorporation
of the Equal Pay Act defenses into Title VII where compensation discrepancies
are at issue).
133. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting that classification by
sex fulfilled the element of intent in Manhart). Although Manhart held that
neither cost nor actuarial bases can justify a discriminatory classification, the
Wambheim court found Manhart inapplicable in a disparate impact case.
Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
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1991,31 the standard at this point seemingly brought the plain-
tiff back full circle to a disparate treatment case by requiring proof
that the employer's articulated non-discriminatory motivation was
a pretext.135 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 gave the plaintiff the
option of rebuttal through offering an alternative employment
practice that the employer refused to adopt. 3 '
Several options exist for demonstrating an alternative
employment practice. Because the statutory language does not
provide guidelines for what constitutes an "alternative employ-
ment practice" sufficient to rebut a "factor other than sex"
defense, 37 the effectiveness of this argument remains uncertain.
If the plaintiff can show that the employer refused to adopt a
health care plan that would have covered HCT/ABMT, the plaintiff
easily demonstrates a pretext. On the other hand, the plaintiff
could attempt to construe "alternative" broadly to mean that the
insurer should define HCT/ABMT as an accepted medical practice
rather than experimental treatment. Success would hinge on
convincing the court that the treatment is no longer experimental.
This approach is troublesome because, as in contract law liti-
gation, it asks the court to render a scientific judgment that it is
ill-equipped to make. 3 ' Finally, the plaintiff could contrast the
explicit exclusion of HCT/ABMT in the current policy with the
prior method of applying the rule of excluding experimental
treatment on a case-by-case basis.39 Not only is the effective-
ness of this alternative unclear,40 a showing that the latter
134. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1074 (1991) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp V 1993)).
135. Pretext implies intent to discriminate. See Greenberger, supra note 66,
at 300 (noting that "one major criticism of Wards Cove is that the Supreme
Court seemed to collapse impact analysis back into disparate treatment" at the
rebuttal stage).
136. See supra notes 66-67, 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing Civil
Rights Act of 1991); cf Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination Under
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1016-17 (1993) (construing
the "alternative employment practice" provision as an alternative way of
establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination).
137. See Greenberger, supra note 66, at 301-02 (discussing the ambiguities
inherent in the alternative employment practice provision).
138. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing one commentator's
critique of judicial competency to determine whether a medical treatment is
experimental).
139. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (describing the customary
experimental treatment exclusion, which insurers had applied to HCT/ABMT
before redrafting contracts to exclude the treatment explicitly).
140. See supra notes 49-51 (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of
explicit exclusionary terms to blanket exclusions).
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alternative has less of a discriminatory impact on women than the
former may prove impossible.
The present state of the law pits a hard-won prima facie case
for the plaintiffagainst an easy standard of defense. Furthermore,
the plaintiff's burden of persuasion ultimately depends on proof
that the defendant's claim of the treatment's experimental status
is pretextual, unless the plaintiff can show the availability of an
alternative policy that would cover HCT/ABMT for breast cancer.
This burden appears far heavier than that faced by plaintiffs
litigating under contract law.' Defendants will argue that if
the experimental treatment exclusion and cost containment are
valid defenses, using the first as a pretext for the second fails to
rise to the necessary level of discrimination. A ruling to the
contrary requires courts to recognize that using the experimental
treatment exclusion as a pretext to avoid paying for expensive
procedures constitutes discrimination to the extent that it
predominantly affects members of one sex.
III. BEYOND CLASSIFICATIONS AND VALUATIONS:
HOW TO TELL IF WOMEN RECEIVE LESS
FROM THEIR HEALTH INSURANCE
A. REQUIRE MUTUALLY EXCLUSiVE CLASSES FOR DISPARATE
TREATMENT ANALYSIS WHERE THE CLASSIFICATION
FULFILLS THE INTENT ELEMENT
Disparate treatment analysis should apply only ifthe plaintiff
can prove that the employer or insurance company intentionally
discriminated against women when it excluded a treatment for
breast cancer. A classification using the term "breast cancer"
shouldnotfulfill the element ofintent unless Congress amends the
definition of "sex" as it did when it enacted the PDA.13 Ajudicial
extension of "sex" to include gender-specific diseases would result
in a "jurisprudence of difference" based upon biology and, more
specifically, upon body parts."T This is a direction the judiciary
141. See supra Part I.C. (discussing contract law litigation and the slant in
plaintiffs' favor when cases applied the rules of construction).
142. See supra note 61 (discussing intent to discriminate as an element of
a prima facie case of disparate treatment).
143. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing the PDA).
144. See Sue V. Rosser, Gender Bias in Clinical Research: The Difference It
Makes, in REFRAMING WOMEN'S HEALTH 257 (Alice J. Dan ed., 1994) (arguing
that the designation of heart disease and AIDS as "male diseases" results in
neglect of research on classes of women at high risk for the same diseases).
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justifiably may decline to take.
B. RECOGNIZE THE VALUE OF HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS AS
RISK COVERAGE
While health insurance is a form of compensation, the value
it provides beneficiaries extends beyond its actuarial value.'45
Justice Stevens understood this well, notingin his Gilbert dissent
that risk coverage represents the true measure of the benefit.
146
The sole question for courts, therefore, should be whether the
challenged plan covers the health risks women face to the same
extent that it covers the health risks men face.
Likewise, courts should reject Gilbert's requirement that they
compare the actuarial value of an insurance package to female
employees with the value to male employees. Such a comparison
runs contrary to insurance group underwriting practice, which
works on the principle that some groups subsidize others. 4 ' If
coverage of women's health risks is costlier than coverage of men's
health risks," this difference should not function to preclude
any disparate impact claim female insureds may make. It would
Rosser also makes the important point, however, that the medical establish-
ment has historically focused exclusively on women's reproductive organs "below
the waist" and has neglected breast cancer because it does not fit within the
obstetrics/gynecology "territory." SUE V. ROSSER, WOMEN'S HEALTH: MISSING
FROM U.S. MEDIcINE 56 (1994).
145. Cf EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 340-44 (insisting that the only proper
measure is the benefit-to-contribution ratio which would force women to bear
the cost of their own health risks, including pregnancy, as opposed to the
"public subsidy" that results if health needs are covered on an equal basis).
146. Justice Stevens argued:
Insurance programs, company policies, and employment contracts all
deal with future risks rather than historic facts. The classification is
between persons who face a risk of pregnancy and those who do not.
... If the word "risk" is used narrowly, men are protected against the
risks associated with a prostate operation whereas women are not. If
the word is used more broadly to describe the risk of uncompensated
unemployment caused by physical disability, men receive total
protection ... against that risk whereas women receive only partial
protection.
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161 n.5 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In a later decision, the Court, quoting Justice Steven's Gilbert
dissent, applied his broad interpretation of "risk." Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983).
147. See supra Part I.B. (describing the nature of group health insurance).
148. For various reasons, health care expense in general is higher for
females than for males. MULLER, supra note 127, at 7-8 (arguing that in spite
of this difference and the fact that women use health care services more than
men, some women's health care needs remain unmet).
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be anomalous to use cost differentials when creating a group plan
and setting its premiums, only to insist subsequently on cost
equality when measuring disparate impact.
Applying this model of analysis to exclusion of HCT/ABMT for
breast cancer, relevant evidence includes comparisons of the rate
of cancer between the two sexes, the incidence of each form of
cancer, and the available treatments at each stage of the dis-
ease. 149 The cost of treatment is irrelevant to the purely medical
question of whether the disease is treatable.'50 Therefore, cost
is also irrelevant to whether the policy covers the disease at issue
to the same extent as other diseases. Likewise, the effectiveness
and experimental status of each treatment should factor into the
analysis only to the extent that the plan articulates overall
standards for such determinations.15'
Courts must develop strict standards for potential defenses of
an insurance policy that places the burden of health risks upon
women. Because courts alreadyhave noted that such claims often
mask the real reason for the exclusion,5 2 they carefully must
scrutinize claims that the experimental status of the treatment
constitutes business necessity as a factor other than sex.
5 3
149. The evidentiary problems inherent in these cases make them
particularly difficult to litigate. The EEOC's recent attempt to investigate Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Missouri was met with predictable resistance. See
EEOC Asks Fed. Court to Enforce Subpoena Against Blue Cross Blue Shield, 3
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 28 (July 14, 1994) (citing EEOC v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield, No. 4:94MC00161 (E.D. Mo. filed July 7,1994)); Woolsey, Discrimination
Alleged, supra note 56, at 2. The EEOC attempted to determine how Blue Cross
decides which cancers are eligible for HCT/ABMT and whether it applies a more
stringent standard for claims by persons afflicted with breast cancer than it
does for claims by people with other cancers. Citing confidentiality concerns,
Blue Cross refused to provide information on any policyholders other than those
who had filed EEOC claims.
150. See Holder, supra note 23, at 805 (hypothesizing a system where
physicians have a duty to involve themselves in their patients' ability to pay for
treatment).
151. Correlation between gender and access to clinical research can cut both
ways: Women may both be encouraged to participate in treatments whose value
is unproven, and denied access to emerging technology that is expensive. See
MULLER, supra note 127, at 230-32 (calling for research on "whether receipt of
unjustified treatment and delay in receiving newer efficacious treatment are
affected by gender and whether type of health plan, source of payment, and
characteristics of the treating doctor influence these outcomes").
152. See supra notes 45-46 (discussing cases litigated under contract law
where courts ruled the exclusion on experimental grounds "arbitrary and
capricious").
153. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing Equal Pay Act
defenses available to employers when discrimination with respect to compen-
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Determining as sufficient the bare assertion that the treatment is
experimental would force plaintiffs to bear the burden of producing
scientific evidence, even though courts already have stressed that
this burden should be borne by the insurance industry.14
Instead, courts should require defendants to describe the standard
by which they determined the treatments experimental status and
prove that they use the same standard for all other treatments and
applications.15 In the case of HCT/ABMT, the policy should
articulate what portion of the procedure is experimental, and why
it is experimental for breast cancer and not for other cancers. 56
If, for example, the purpose of the research "experiment" is to
compare the effectiveness of standard versus high dosages of
chemotherapy, the plan should indicate that it never approves
dosage comparison studies. If the bone marrow transplant is
considered experimental, defendants must show how it differs
from bone marrow transplants among other cancer patients.
Finally, courts should impose a duty upon the insurance
industry to reevaluate the experimental status of a treatment at
the time of a plaintiff's application for coverage. Because a
fiduciary must interpret insurance terms in good faith, it stands to
reason that it also must revise explicit terms that have become
anachronistic.'57 While it is difficult to distinguish between
asking the court to decide whether the treatment is experimental
and asking the court to decide whether the insurance company's
determination that it is experimental was reasonable, such a
distinction is the key to these cases.
sation is at stake).
154. See supra note 48 (discussing the duty courts place on insurers to
research the current status of experimental treatments).
155. For example, it would be important to compare how the same policy
dealt with the transition from radical mastectomy as the treatment of choice for
breast cancer to adjuvant therapies, including radiation and chemotherapy.
This transition took place over two decades beginning in the 1970s. Hortobagyi
& Buzdar, supra note 19, at 200.
156. This would bring the Title VII cause of action in line with the doctrine
emerging from courts that have applied the ADA in discrimination claims
regarding HCT/ABMT for breast cancer. See supra notes 56, 100, 105
(discussing cases brought under the ADA).
157. See Lee N. Newcomer, Defining Experimental Therapy-A Third.Party
Payer's Dilemma, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1702, 1702-03 (1990) (noting that
emerging technology requires reevaluation by insurers and thus creates
exposure to risk); see also supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing
the emergence from HCT/ABMT cases under contract law of a duty to update
scientific judgments when a beneficiary requests coverage for an excluded
treatment).
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If the court accepts defendant's claim that the experimental
status of the treatment constitutes a business necessity defense,
plaintiff's proof that the claim is pretextual can take various forms.
Showing that the insurance provider approved other medical
treatments at the same stage of emergence as HCT/ABMT
suggests that the claim of business necessity is pretextual. 55
Similarly, if the policy applies a different criterion for HCT/ABMT
than it does for other treatments, the claim is a pretext. Finally,
a plaintiff's showing that the insurer rejected an available
alternative criterion for determining the experimental status of a
treatment would be evidence of pretext.
CONCLUSION
HCT/ABMT is a promising, albeit costly, treatment for a
disease that represents a major health risk for women. Although
the practice of excluding experimental treatments from health
care coverage relieves insurers from funding medical treatments
of questionable value, HCT/ABMT for breast cancer does not fit
this mold. When insurance companies apply the traditional
experimental treatment exclusion rule to HCT/ABMT and deny
coverage of the treatment to breast cancer patients, they stand a
significant chance of losing when those patients sue under contract
law principles. In an effort to avoid such litigation, many insurers
now explicitly exclude HCT/ABMT for breast cancer from their
policies. Although the rationale for this exclusion remains the
same, plaintiffs cannot challenge application of the experimental
treatment rule under contract law principles when exclusion is an
explicit contract term.
For most insured Americans, however, health insurance is a
benefit of employment. When cutting the cost of insurance is a
pretext for discrimination on the basis of sex, it is ripe for chal-
lenge under civil rights law. Thus if an insurance plan offered as
158. In other words, courts should compare HCT/ABMT with other
treatments undergoing Phase IV randomized trials, some of which may
nevertheless be classified as accepted medical practice. Consistent criteria for
determining what is accepted medical practice is the key to finding appropri-
ately analogous treatments to HCT/ABMT. Courts evaluating claims under the
ADA have used this analytical framework. See, e.g., Polifko v. King, No. 94-05,
1995 WL 33981, at *7 (EEOC Jan. 4, 1995) (seeking evidence that insurance
carrier excludes coverage of ABMT for conditions other than breast cancer).
Lack of established or consistent criteria was important in litigation of
HCT/ABMT coverage for breast cancer under contract law. See supra Part I.C.
(discussing the issues litigated under contract law).
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a benefit of employment covers the health risks that women face
to a lesser extent than it does the health risks faced by men, this
discrepancy falls under Title VII. It is reasonable to expect that
the duty not to discriminate in the employment setting includes
the duty to prevent a class of individuals guaranteed protection
under civil rights law from bearing the burden of health risk.
